Matthew Nix v. United States, et al.

In McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984), this Court held that a party seeking a new trial on the basis of juror dishonesty must "first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause." The Court said nothing more about how either prong is to be applied, and the courts of appeals at every circuit have splintered on the meaning of each. The questions presented are:

1. In applying McDonough's first prong, which asks whether "a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire," should the court apply a) the First Circuit's reasonable-judge, totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry, under which even inadvertent dishonesty may bear on the analysis and no motive to serve need be shown; b) the Second Circuit's requirement that the juror's dishonesty be motivated by a desire to secure a seat on the jury; c) the Third and Seventh Circuits' plain inquiry into whether the juror in fact failed to answer honestly, keyed to for-cause materiality rather than motive; d) the Fourth Circuit's rule that the McDonough test reaches innocent nondisclosure as well as deliberate concealment, so that even inadvertent nondisclosure may satisfy the prong; e) the Fifth Circuit's requirement that the dishonest nondisclosure be rooted in bias or prejudice; f) the Sixth Circuit's rule that deliberate concealment permits an inference of bias while unintentional nondisclosure requires proof of actual bias; g) the Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits' requirement of intentional dishonesty with no motive-to-serve element; h) the Ninth Circuit's recognition of multiple forms of bias amid acknowledged intercircuit disarray; or i) the D.C. Circuit's requirement of a showing of actual bias rather than treating voir dire dishonesty as per se evidence of partiality?

2. In applying McDonough's second prong, which asks whether "a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause," should a court apply a) the Third, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits' traditional for-cause-challenge test, under which it is enough that a correct answer would have supported a challenge for cause; b) the First and Second Circuits' trial-court-discretion test, under which relief rests in the court's discretion and no formal for-cause basis is indispensable; c) the Fourth and Eighth Circuits' test requiring a for-cause basis plus a showing that the juror's motivation affected the fairness of the trial; or d) the D.C. Circuit's test requiring a for-cause basis plus a showing of actual bias?