Christopher Endres, et ux. v. San Diego Housing Commission, et al.

Whether the discriminatory operation of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and § 1915(e)(2)— resulting in the omission of operative pleadings, exclusion of essential defendants, failure to docket corrected filings, denial of PACER access due to fee barriers, creation of an incomplete record, and dismissal of the appeal without meaningful review of the operative complaint and evidentiary submissions— combined with courts exercising authority after asserting they lacked jurisdiction, creates an unconstitutional two-tiered system of judicial access that denies indigent litigants the equal protection and due process afforded to fee-paying litigants.

Whether a district court may terminate a removed case without adjudicating the federal claims or issuing a remand order, thereby permitting state-court proceedings—including a default judgment and writ of possession—to continue without jurisdiction in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d).

Whether a series of procedural closures across administrative, municipal, state, and federal systems—each preventing Petitioners from obtaining any merits review—constitutes a structural violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Whether a court may dismiss an appeal without addressing unrebutted allegations implicating due process, appellate jurisdiction, the integrity of judicial proceedings, and the omission of essential defendants from the caption and record, where no respondent has appeared or opposed the appeal. 5. Whether municipalities violate the Due Process Clause by enacting and enforcing ordinances that manufacture public animus and state-created danger by labeling non-criminal civil status—such as vehicle habitation, oversized-vehicle parking, sidewalk vending, disability-related housing instability, or poverty—as “health and safety” threats, thereby depriving residents of housing, mobility, and access to public spaces without individualized suspicion or judicial review.

Whether a municipality or its contracted agents may use federal Permanent Supportive Housing (PSH) funds to impose forced placement into a medicalized behavioral-health facility model on indigent residents—by designating private residences as “behavioral health facilities” through National Provider Identifier (NPI) registrations, without medical or psychiatric necessity, clinical diagnosis, knowledge or consent—without violating the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine.

Whether a municipality violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses when it imposes sex-offender-style and felon-level geographic, curfew, and exclusion restrictions on individuals who are not felons, have no criminal history, and have never been accused of sex-offense conduct.

Whether a municipality acting simultaneously as legislator, housing authority, enforcement body, and adjudicator may author, enact, enforce, and adjudicate the same policies affecting indigent and disabled residents, where this consolidation of power eliminates any neutral forum for review and results in the closure of due process at every turn. 9. Whether a municipality violates the Public Trust Doctrine, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause by reclassifying public-trust coastal land and surplus public land to evade affordable-housing obligations and privatize it for commercial or hotel use, while simultaneously enforcing curfews, exclusion zones, towing, and felon-style restrictions that exclude indigent, disabled, senior and vehicle-dwelling residents from those same public areas.

Whether a municipality violates the Free Exercise Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause when it conditions access to lawful employment, self-employment, and RV-dwelling permits on the possession of a residential address that indigent residents cannot provide, thereby forcing individuals with sincerely held religious beliefs against dishonesty to choose between compelled dishonesty and categorical exclusion from all lawful means of economic survival.

Whether a municipality may enter a class-action settlement that suspends constitutional protections for an entire socio-economic class and authorizes the future reinstatement of criminal penalties—including jail time—for a life-sustaining biological necessity such as self-sheltering.

Whether a municipality may impose criminal penalties (including jail time), escalating administrative fines (including automatic doubling), and sex-offender-style geographic exclusion zones for conduct that is not criminal, is life-sustaining, and cannot be avoided, particularly for indigent, disabled, and senior residents such as sleeping, resting, parking, erecting a tent for shelter, or using one’s own vehicle as shelter.