Sixto Jorge Díaz-Colón v. United States

Petitioner Sixto Jorge Díaz-Colón, represented by court-appointed counsel, was convicted of attempted Hobbs Act extortion, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, interstate transmission of an extortionate threat, 18 U.S.C. § 875(d), and destruction of records in a federal investigation, 18 U.S.C. § 1519, based principally on conversations during two restaurant meetings and a single Telegram message that the First Circuit conceded contained no demand for money, no quid pro quo, and no request for anything of value. The First Circuit affirmed. United States v. Díaz-Colón, 163 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2025), No. 23-1692 (Document ID 00118382590) (Lipez, J., joined by Barron, C.J., and Thompson, J.). The questions presented are:

1. Whether unrecorded conversations and negotiations, unaccompanied by any operational conduct, payment, delivery, transfer of property, or concrete execution, can satisfy the “substantial step” element of attempt under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, where this Court has reaffirmed that “the mere intent to violate a federal criminal statute is not punishable as an attempt unless it is also accompanied by significant conduct.” United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 107 (2007); see also United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845, 851 (2022).

2. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 875(d) — which criminalizes only the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of a communication “with intent to extort” — permits conviction where the charged interstate communication (a Telegram message) concededly contained no extortionate demand, and the element of “intent to extort” is supplied retroactively by later intrastate conversations never transmitted across state lines, in conflict with Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723 (2015), Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393 (2003), and the Second Circuit’s construction of § 875(d) in United States v. Jackson, 180 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1999).

3. Whether a general verdict of guilt on a Hobbs Act extortion count must be vacated under Sekhar v. United States, 570 U.S. 729 (2013), where the jury was permitted to convict on an alternative theory premised on