Andrew W. Bell v. Georgia

Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated when a state court system creates a complete procedural void by: (a) the state supreme court transferring a case raising substantial constitutional questions to an intermediate appellate court; (b) the intermediate appellate court failing to docket the transferred case; and (c) the state supreme court thereafter refusing to accept filings in the case, declaring that the petitioner has "no case pending before this Court" — thereby denying the petitioner access to any appellate forum for the adjudication of preserved constitutional claims in pending criminal cases.

Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009), and Rippo v. Baker, 580 U.S. , 137 S. Ct. 905 (2017) (per curiam), require disqualification of a trial judge when the cumulative pattern of conduct demonstrates an unconstitutional probability of bias, including: (a) allowing courtroom personnel to silence a pro se defendant during proceedings; (b) directing staff to inscribe "refused to sign" on a Faretta waiver the defendant never received; (c) denying the defendant access to courtroom technology while permitting the prosecution such access; (d) refusing to compel constitutionally mandated discovery; and (e) refusing to rule on multiple properly filed pretrial motions.

Whether the State violates Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it continues to prosecute a defendant based on an arresting officer's testimony about a "person down call" and EMS contact that the State's own representative admits it cannot produce evidence of, the arresting officer's own body camera contradicts the arrest report, a fellow officer stated on camera that they had no probable cause, and a belatedly produced Computer Aided Dispatch report contains internal contradictions and evidence of post-hoc alteration.

Whether a state trial court violates the Due Process Clause by systematically refusing to rule on dispositive pretrial motions — including motions to dismiss, motions to compel discovery, motions for reconsideration, and applications for certificate of immediate review — thereby nullifying a criminal defendant's statutory right to meaningful appellate review before trial, and whether state appellate courts may summarily deny mandamus relief without explanation despite unrebutted evidence of such judicial inaction.