Erin A. Snider v. Texas A&M University

The Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., entitles eligible employees to leave for a family member’s serious health condition (“familycare”), 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C), or their own (“selfcare”), 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). This Court has held that Congress validly abrogated state sovereign immunity for family-care claims, Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 724 (2003), but not for self-care claims, Coleman v. Ct. of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30, 33, 39 (2012). Against a state employer, this classification alone determines whether a plaintiff’s claim may proceed. This case involves Petitioner’s FMLA leave to receive medical care for her unborn daughter, who had been diagnosed with a serious health condition distinct from Petitioner’s own. A Texas intermediate appellate court assumed, without deciding, that such leave could qualify as family-care leave but articulated no standard for what a plaintiff must prove to establish that her leave was for the child’s condition rather than her own. The questions presented are:

1. Whether leave taken by a pregnant woman to care for her unborn child’s serious health condition can constitute family-care leave under 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C); and

2. If so, in determining if that leaves qualifies as family-care under 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (C), whether a court may impose a heightened requirement on pregnant women—and only pregnant women—to prove that the leave she took was for her child’s serious health condition rather than for her own serious health condition under § 2612(a)(1)(D).