Bonnie Townsend, as Executrix of the Estate of Linda Elam v. BLC Lexington SNF, LLC, et al.

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), provides statutory criteria for affirming an arbitration award, FAA 9 U.S.C. § 9, and for vacating an arbitration award, FAA 9 U.S.C. § 10. The FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 10, provides for the vacating of an arbitration award where there is “evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators.” This Court set forth a standard requiring an affirmative duty on an arbitrator to disclose any appearance of bias in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968). Since Commonwealth Coatings, there has been considerable confusion among the circuits regarding the case’s holding, leading to a circuit split. Some circuits, including the Sixth Circuit from which this Petition arises, have imposed a much higher standard under 9 U.S.C. § 10 to vacate an arbitration award, requiring that “the challenging party must show that ‘a reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial’ to the other party to the arbitration” and “the party asserting evident partiality must establish specific facts that indicate improper motives on the part of the arbitrator.” Id. Uhl v. Komatsu Forklift Co., Ltd., 512 F.3d 294, 306 (6th Cir. 2008). The questions presented are:

1. Is the Sixth Circuit Opinion incorrectly applying U.S. Supreme Court precedent to vacate arbitration awards by requiring specific conduct in the particular case meriting disqualification, an issue on which there is a circuit split, or is the standard one of “appearance of bias” as this Court has previously held?

2. Did the Sixth Circuit incorrectly impose a heightened burden on Petitioner to vacate the arbitration award, and does application of this Court’s Commonwealth Coatings standard, or even the Sixth Circuit’s much higher standard, merit reversal due to the arbitrator’s prior relationship with the Respondents and his prior undisclosed history of quid pro quo/bribery misconduct?