Peter Malkin, et al. v. Virginia Shasha, et al.

The first question presented involves the proper scope of review of an arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act. The Courts of Appeals are split on whether the doctrine of manifest disregard of the law survived this Court’s decision in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). Hall Street held that the enumerated grounds for vacatur of an arbitration award in the FAA are “exclusive.” Four Circuits have since held that manifest disregard no longer exists; four Circuits have held that it does; and the remaining three have yet to address the issue. State courts applying the FAA typically follow the federal circuits where they are located, confirming and amplifying this split. See Hoskins v. Hoskins, 497 S.W.3d 490, 498-500 (Tex. 2016) (Willet, J., concurring) (“The upshot of today’s decision is that we avoid the sort of quagmire that surrounds the TAA’s federal counterpart, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). . . . And so courts and commentators await a definitive answer from the Supreme Court.”) (footnotes omitted). Furthermore, courts that do recognize manifest disregard have developed varying formulations of the doctrine. This Court’s resolution of these issues is essential, given the very substantial stakes in many arbitrations. Thus, the first question presented is: is manifest disregard of the law a ground to vacate an arbitration award and if so, what does it mean?

The second question presented involves consent to service of petitions to confirm or vacate an arbitration