Orlando Chavez v. United States

In Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017), this Court held that in a prosecution for procurement of naturalization based on a false statement, the government must prove that an accurate statement would have resulted in an investigation and “that the investigation ‘would predictably have disclosed’ some legal disqualification.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 774 (1988)). Additionally, in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), this Court held that it was an error for a federal court to defer to a legal interpretation, decision, or regulation of an administrative agency, and that the court must make those legal decisions independent of agency interpretation. Id. at 2273. The Question Presented is: Whether a court can defer to an immigration agency regulation that expands the circumstances under which a naturalization applicant fails to meet the good moral character requirement in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) in order to find a “legal disqualification” as required by Maslenjakthe or whether the term “legal disqualification” in Maslenjak requires proof of a statutory disqualification without deference to an agency regulation?