Jonathan David Grenon v. United States

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, (“RFRA”), forbids the Government from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion unless the Government “demonstrates that application of the burden to the person 1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b). The RFRA further provides that “[a] person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c). The Question Presented is: Does a pro se criminal defendant properly assert a claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act that a criminal prosecution substantially burdens his Constitutional right to exercise religious freedom by claiming that the prosecution violates the First Amendment and that it prevents him from exercising his religious rights and by moving to dismiss the indictment arguing that “Our Religious freedoms have been violated,” and “Our Freedom of speech violated,” or as the Eleventh Circuit held, must a pro se defendant actually cite the RFRA by name or statute in order to avoid plain error review on appeal?