Jason Steven Kokinda v. United States

Introduction: The case sub judice alleges that the defendant violated 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) by living a nomadic lifestyle of constant travel through multiple states and counties. No instructions were presented to the jury to decide whether he violated any state sex offender registry law or established a “change of residence” according to the ordinary-English-usage rule announced in Nichols v. United States, 578 U.S. 104, 136 S. Ct. 1113, 194 L. Ed. 2d 324 (2016). Instead, the trial court relied on lengthy DOJ guidelines to conclude that his regular day-time commutes to one city and brief stays at campgrounds in multiple counties of West Virginia altogether constituted a violation of SORNA. Trial counsel failed to preserve errors. Question Presented: Did the lower courts commit plain error requiring summary reversal by reinterpreting the elements of 18 U.S.C. § 2250, (construed by the unanimous Supreme Court panel in Nichols v. United States, 578 U.S. 104, 136 S. Ct. 1113, 194 L. Ed. 2d 324 (2016),) to thereby criminalize a law-abiding modus operandi of never staying longer than state law allows unregistered visitors and moving on? Question Presented: Is the term “habitually lives” merely ambiguous in isolation, or subject to the rule of lenity, in any regard, because the Attorney General was not delegated specific authority to interpret 18 U.S.C. § 2250 in compliance with judicial canons and lacked the expertise required to provide Skidmore deference post-Loper Bright?