Kyle Shirakawa Handley v. Christopher Pierce, Warden

California Penal Code section 209 defines two different offenses: simple kidnapping for ransom (punishable by life with parole) and aggravated kidnapping for ransom (punishable by life without parole). Aggravated kidnapping for ransom requires the state to prove either “bodily harm” or a “substantial likelihood of death.” In People v. Britton, 6 Cal.2d 1 (1936), the California Supreme Court held that defendants were not entitled to notice of such punishment-enhancing facts. Britton did not address the Sixth Amendment right to notice because that right had not yet been applied to the states. Here, as both the state appellate court and the District Court recognized, the state charged petitioner with simple kidnapping for ransom. App. 87a, 120a. Yet, consistent with the 1936 decision in Britton, the state obtained a conviction for aggravated kidnapping for ransom and the trial court sentenced petitioner to life without parole. The state appellate court rejected petitioner’s Sixth Amendment notice claim, ruling that it was required to follow Britton and, in any event, the judge’s comments near the end of trial provided constitutionally adequate notice. App. 157a-161a. The District Court “doubt[ed]” petitioner’s conviction “comported with the notice and pleading requirements” of the Sixth Amendment, but nevertheless denied relief, ruling that Britton was not contrary to “clearly established federal law” under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). App. 87a-89a. A divided Ninth Circuit panel affirmed in a published opinion. App. 2a-83a. The panel majority’s published opinion gives rise to the following two questions:

1. Does the California Supreme Court’s 1936 holding that a defendant’s right to notice does not apply to facts which merely “increase the penalty” violate the Sixth Amendment?

2. Can constitutionally adequate notice of enhanced charges be given at the end of trial, or must notice be given in a manner that affords defendants an opportunity to prepare before trial?