Charles Denard Milbry v. Florida

Petitioner played a relatively minor role in his acceptance of plea. A trial judge was assigned to petitioner’s case when it was filed in 1996 and presided over his acceptance of a plea. The proceedings were marked with irregularities from the outset, when a state trial judge, contrary to decisional law, failed to determine if the petitioner had actually forfeited his rights to affirmative election (which current sentence is in violation of ex post facto laws) to choose which sentence guidelines would be imposed under the guidelines at the time of his offenses as opposed to at the time of his sentence or to consult with the petitioner's public defender to ensure that the petitioner would intelligently understand his rights to affirmative election during the acceptance of a plea. Despite this and other errors, the court recognized this issue and failed to address that there was no clear and unequivocal choice by the petitioner. In 2013 and 2015, petitioner sought relief from sentence, and his motion under 3.800(a) was assigned to the Thirteen Judicial Circuit Court, In and For, Hillsborough County, State of Florida. In these claims the petitioner was raising his illegal habitualization. Substantive action was taken by the trial court on the case, thus, denying petitioner’s motion without a hearing. On May 13, 2025, petitioner file a 3.800(a) addressing that he was not allowed to affirmative election which caused his sentence to increase in violation of ex post facto laws, where he was entitled to the election process, citing the Florida Supreme Court case Logan v. State, 921 So.2d 556 (Fla. 2005); Also see Bogan v State, 502 So.2d 1341 (Fla.2nd DCA 1897). In an order that misstated the record and ignored decisional laws that directly undermined the factual basis for petitioner’s sentence, the state trial court refused a to reverse, foreclosing appellate review of the merits of petitioner’s claims and the state district court’s denial of fact PCA. There is no State statute that holds discretionary support, thus the constitutional violating issue would by the State court would constitute a “defect in the integrity” of the proceedings, as similar recognized in Logan, as a proper basis for constitutional consideration under the U.S. Const. 8th Amendment. The following questions are presented. 1. Did the State trial court err in its reading of Logan, given that other state appeal courts read Logan to allow state courts to remedy a wide range of procedural defects in 3.800(a) proceedings, similar to the one alleged by Petitioner here? 2. If a claim seeking relief will certify a manifest injustice qualifies as the sort of “defect in the integrity of the State court proceedings” that would support a 3.800(a) motion under Logan, and may a reviewing court in determining that motion consider the reasonableness of that judge’s prior disposition of the petitioner’s claims for relief? 3. Did the State trial court, which to date, has never identified any debatable issue in any post-conviction appeal, where there is no state statute but the highest State Court decisional law where such is bound by