Christopher Lynn Johnson v. Pennsylvania

Due process requires that every criminal charge be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). An “instructional error [that] consists of a misdescription of the burden of proof” results in structural error that is not subject to harmless error review. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993). Here, the trial court improperly instructed the jury on petitioner’s defense of voluntary intoxication to the charge of first-degree murder. These instructions imposed a far more burdensome standard, equivalent to that required of the defenses of insanity and involuntary intoxication, than was required for petitioner to prove that he did not possess a specific intent to kill. The error relieved the Commonwealth of its burden to disprove petitioner’s sole defense beyond a reasonable doubt. But neither the Commonwealth nor trial counsel brought this error to the court’s attention. In Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286 (2017), this Court held that when counsel’s deficient performance results in structural error, automatic reversal is not necessarily required in post-conviction proceedings, and a defendant must still establish prejudice pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). However, the Court expressly reserved the question of whether an attorney’s deficient performance resulting in a structural error that causes fundamental unfairness, such as the Sullivan error here, necessarily establishes Strickland prejudice requiring reversal. Weaver, 582 U.S. at 301-03. The question presented is: Does an attorney’s failure to object to unconstitutional instructions that relieve the Commonwealth of its burden of disproving an accused’s defense beyond a reasonable doubt result in a structural error of fundamental unfairness requiring reversal?