Raymond H. Pierson, III v. Phyliss M. Rushing

Petitioner Dr. Pierson was acutely stricken by the emergent development of an acute life threatening cardiac condition which required immediate hospi­ talization for an emergency cardiac surgery procedure at the Stanford University Medical Center. Despite having been presented with the evidence of Dr. Pierson’s life-threatening cardiac condition requiring emergency cardiac surgical intervention and having been provided with the opportunity to speak with Dr. Pierson’s Stanford Cardiac physicians, the Amador County trial court concluded that Dr. Pierson’s absence was “willful” and the trial court proceeded to dismiss the case. The underlying matter involves Phyliss Rushing driving her car into and destroying Dr. Pierson’s med­ ical office. The insurer, CSAA Insurances Services et al. refused to settle. Pierson sought to bring suit against the insurance company; however the trial court only permitted the case to be styled with Rushing as the Defendant, contrary to Cal. Code. Civ. P. 1559 which states “A contract, made expressly for the benefit of a third person, may be enforced by him at any time before the parties thereto rescind it.” Well-estab­ lished early Court precedents [Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 118 U.S. 394, Hn. 4 (1886) and Gulf, C. & S.F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897)] recognized that “corporations are persons within the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. ” The Questions Presented are: Question 1 la. Isn’t it true that under the Fifth and Four­ teenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, that Dr. Pierson, a self-represented party without alternative