Thomas Mitchell Overton v. Ricky D. Dixon, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) prevents federal courts from granting habeas petitions for constitutional violations regarding state court criminal convictions unless the state’s adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). This Court has held that to overcome “AEDPA deference,” the application of the federal law must be unreasonable, a standard higher than that of “clear error.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). In Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), this Court held that “the ‘final interpretation of the laws’” would be in “the proper and peculiar province of the courts.” Id. at 385 (citation omitted). The first question presented is: 1. Whether AEDPA deference is unconstitutional under Loper Bright. Under the prejudice standard for a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim and the materiality standard under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), a petitioner does not have to show that he would have been acquitted but for the constitutional violation; he only needs to show that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different, which is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. The Eleventh Circuit—like all of the courts to consider this issue before it—held Mr. Overton to a higher standard, one that requires him to completely undermine the reliability of the DNA evidence offered against him even