Adrienne Apuzza v. NYU Langone Long Island

Did the Court create conflicts in the law by failing to be guided by the common-law rule, wellestablished public policy and the long legal tradition protecting an employee’s, or any competent person’s, decision to refuse any unwanted medical treatment?

Did the Court create conflicts in law, pursuant to recent Supreme Court authority, that compulsory treatment for the health benefit of the person treated —as opposed to compulsory treatment for the health benefit of others—implicates the fundamental right to refuse a medical treatment based on medical priva­ cy and informed consent as echoed in the statute?

Did the Court err by failing to consider that an employer violates the ADA’s prohibition on dis­ criminatory qualification standards when it imposes a non-job-related medical treatment as a condition for employment, and then treats her adversely despite claiming ADA protection of her job, given the fact that the employee alleged that the medical treatment only claims to lessen symptoms for the user but does not claim to prevent infection of others, and the em­ ployee alleged that the employer regards any untreated employee as a “direct threat” to health and safety with­ out first performing an individualized assessment as required?

Did the Court abuse its discretion by failing to consider the Congressional intent and standard of review for ADA pleadings by failing to review de­ fendant’s response to determine if it expressed any viable ADA defense?

Is a covered employer required by the ADA to show, particularly when challenged, that the new