G. W., a Minor, By and Through Her Guardian Ad Litem, Nicole Ward, et al. v. Coronado Unified School District, et al.

California’s anti-SLAPP statute authorizes dismissal and mandatory fee shifting only if the moving defendant first establishes that the challenged claim arises from that defendant’s protected activity. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1); Baral v. Schnitt, 1 Cal. 5th 376, 384, 396 (2016); Park v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ., 2 Cal. 5th 1057, 1062–64 (2017); Bonni v. St. Joseph Health Sys., 11 Cal. 5th 995, 1009–10 (2021). Here, however, the California Court of Appeal expressly stated that it could not determine whether the claims against each defendant arose from protected activity without a defendant-specific factual showing, but nevertheless affirmed dismissal by treating that missing showing from petitioner’s opening brief as petitioners’ appellate “forfeiture.” App.12-

Petitioners later challenged the resulting fee award on the ground that the anti-SLAPP dismissal had been entered in excess of the authority conferred by statute and thus could not support mandatory fee shifting. Even if that defect rendered the dismissal only voidable, not fundamentally void, California law recognizes direct attack by appeal as the proper method of challenging such an excess-of-jurisdiction act. People v. Am. Contractors Indem. Co., 33 Cal. 4th 653, 660–61 (2004). The same court nevertheless invoked law of the case, rejected that collateral attack as “frivolous,” and sanctioned counsel. App.39-46. The question presented is: Whether, consistent with the Due Process Clause and this Court’s adequate-and-independent-stateground doctrine, a state court may extinguish federal civil-rights claims by invoking a novel appellate