Jamar M. Davis v. United States

Together, 10 U.S.C. §§ 920b(c) and 920b(h)(5)(B) impose criminal liability for “commit[ting] a lewd act upon a child” by “intentionally exposing one’s genitalia . . . to a child by any means, including via communication technology, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, or degrade any person, or to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.” (emphasis added). J.R., a minor, reached out to Petitioner on Snapchat, unsolicited, and immediately launched into sexually-charged banter with him. Believing he was interacting with an adult, Petitioner responded with explicit images of himself. However, the lower court concluded his belief that he was communicating with an adult was “irrelevant” because “‘the underlying crime is properly deemed a strict liability offense.”’ App.17 (quoting United States v. Gifford, 75 M.J. 140, 142 (C.A.A.F. 2016) (citing Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 443 n.7 (1985) (White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., dissenting))). The question presented is: Whether subsections (d)(1) and (d)(2) of 10 U.S.C. § 920b (2024) relieve the Government of the burden of proving the specific intent required for “intentionally exposing . . . genitalia . . . to a child.”