Stephanie M. Redding v. Markwayne Mullin, Secretary of Homeland Security

I. Whether an employer satisfies its obligation under the Rehabilitation Act and 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) engage in a good-faith interactive process when it (a) proposes a reassignment while knowingly withholding that acceptance will eliminate a separately pending disabilityretirement benefit, and (b) closes the accommodation process before the reassignment’s required training is completed and before the accommodation can be evaluated for effectiveness. II. Whether the Fourth Circuit’s ruling that a completed reassignment forecloses inquiry into the good faith of the process that produced it conflicts with A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Sch., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 279, 605 U.S. 335 (2025), and the multi-circuit consensus that delay or concealment in the interactive process may itself constitute a failure to accommodate. III. Whether the government may invoke an employee’s participation in a proposed accommodation as “voluntary” consent foreclosing further judicial inquiry where the government obtained that participation while concealing material facts about its consequences, in conflict with the principle of Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968), that consent procured through government concealment is not voluntary.