Wealthy, Inc., et al. v. Spencer Cornelia, et al.

Many States have enacted anti-SLAPP statutes that authorize a special motion to dismiss, impose a heightened burden on the plaintiff, and mandate feeshifting to a prevailing defendant. The courts of appeals are divided three ways on whether and how such statutes operate in federal court under Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010). The D.C., Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits hold they are displaced by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 56. The First Circuit applies them as enacted. The Ninth Circuit— in the decision below—applies a hybrid approach that substitutes the Federal Rules’ merits standards while preserving mandatory fee-shifting. The court below granted Nevada’s anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss after designating Petitioners as limited-purpose public figures and finding no actual malice under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Questions Presented are:

1. Whether such an anti-SLAPP statute is displaced by Rules 12(b)(6) and 56, applies as enacted, or applies only in the hybrid form described above.

2. Whether the Ninth Circuit erred by designating Petitioners as limited-purpose public figures without finding a pre-existing public controversy, voluntary injection into it, and germaneness, as required by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979), and Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979).