Marcellus Henderson v. United States

The federal bank robbery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), imposes criminal liability on “[w]hoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take, … or obtains or attempts to obtain by extortion any property or money … [from] any bank.” The so-called “elements clause” of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) provides for enhanced sentencing penalties where a defendant uses or carries a firearm in relation to a “crime of violence,” which is defined in relevant part as a felony that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). It is undisputed that § 2113(a) bank robbery “by extortion” cannot satisfy § 924(c)’s elements clause on its own and accordingly is not a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A). The questions presented here, which are also presented in Armstrong v. United States, No. 24-__ (petition filed July 1, 2025), are:

1. Is federal bank robbery in § 2113(a) indivisible, such that no form of bank robbery qualifies as a “crime of violence” for purposes of § 924(c)?

2. If the statute is divisible, did the Eleventh Circuit err in holding that attempted federal bank robbery necessarily includes “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force,” such that it qualifies as a “crime of violence” for purposes of § 924(c)?