Elvin Torres-Estrada v. United States

In Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012), this Court underscored what it then saw as important differences between the plea-bargaining issues raised in Hill1 and Padilla2 —on one hand—and the unique issue later raised in Frye—on the other—by noting the flux inherent in the pleabargaining process where a defendant rejects a plea offer: When a plea offer has . . . been rejected, however, no formal court proceedings are involved. This underscores that the plea-bargaining process is often in flux, with no clear standards or timelines and with no judicial supervision of the discussions between prosecution and defense. Indeed, discussions between client and defense counsel are privileged. So the prosecution has little or no notice if something may be amiss and perhaps no capacity to intervene in any event. Frye at 143, emphasis added. Because Elvin Torres-Estrada (Mr. Torres-Estrada) presents unique, undisputed facts and a novel Frye scenario, the issue he presents is therefore:

1. Whether the inaccurate advice by Mr. TorresEstrada’s rogue attorney to reject a favorable plea agreement during plea negotiations, with the prosecutor’s contemporaneous awareness, deprived Torres-Estrada of his right to the effective assistance of counsel just as in Lafler v. Cooper?3

2. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985).

3. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).

4. 566 U.S. 134 (2012).