William Stenger v. United States

Article III requires federal courts to confirm their jurisdiction over a case before adjudicating its merits, whether that jurisdiction is “constitutional” or “statutory” in nature. Steel Co. v. Cits. for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998). Here, the Second Circuit explicitly chose not to do so. Instead, it invoked so-called “hypothetical statutory jurisdiction” to skip the jurisdictional inquiry and reach the merits. This practice has drawn every court of appeals into a conflict, which “raises serious concerns” that only this Court can resolve. Waleski v. Montgomery, McCracker, Walker & Rhoads, LLP, 143 S.Ct. 2027, 2027 (2023) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari, joined by Gorsuch, J. and Barrett, J.). This case also presents a second longstanding circuit conflict over the availability of coram nobis relief to correct a criminal restitution order. Here, the Second Circuit merely assumed that the All Writs Act provides such jurisdiction and rushed to rubber-stamp the District Court’s rejection of such relief on the merits. Those decisions (i) looked past newfound, undisputed evidence that Petitioner’s restitution order is based on a state official’s false testimony and (ii) are “ultra vires.” Id. at 2028 (quoting Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 102). The questions presented are:

1. Whether a court exercising so-called “hypothetical statutory jurisdiction” exceeds its power under Article III; and

2. Whether a district court may issue a writ of coram nobis to correct a fundamental error in a criminal restitution order.