Larry E. Parrish v. Supreme Court of Tennessee

Is Rule 10B, Rules Of The Supreme Court Of The State Of Tennessee (“Rule 10B”) (App. C, No. 6) (App. pp. 7a-10a) a structural constitutional violation1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Due Process Clause, United States Constitution (“Fourteenth Amendment”) (App. C, No. 1) (App. C p. 5a)?

If Rule 10B (App. C pp. 7a-10a), itself, is a structural constitutional violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, is Rule 10B, per se, facially unconstitutional?

Is the right of every litigant in the United States to access a judge who, according to Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1 (2016) (“Williams”)2 and Rippo v. Baker, 580 U.S. 285 (2017) (“Rippo”), is constitutionally qualified an unconditional, non-waivable/non-forfeitable structural constitutional right?3

Zachary L. Henderson, A Comprehensive Consideration of the Structural-Error Doctrine, 85 Mo. L. Rev. 965 (2020).

Lauren Keane, Williams v. Pennsylvania: The Intolerable Image of Judicial Bias, 49 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 181 (2017).

On January 3, 2003, Slavin filed a motion requesting that Ladd recuse himself . . . BPR contends that Slavin’s failure to seek recusal in a timely manner has foreclosed this issue. . . . “The failure to seek recusal in a timely manner results in a waiver of a party’s right to question a judge’s impartiality.” Id. Even though there is evidence to support a finding that the recusal issue was waived for failure to raise it in a timely manner, we nevertheless prefer to address the issue. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility v. Slavin, 145 S.W.3d 538, 547-48 (Tenn. 2004)