Kh'Lajuwon Amari Murat v. United States

In Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000), this Court, interpreting a since-amended version of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), applied an “unconventional” definition of “revoke” to find that a revoked term of supervised release “retain[s] some vitality after revocation.” Johnson, 529 U.S. at 706–07. This Court did so in order to allow for the reimposition of supervised release following revocation, “a power not readily apparent from the text of § 3583(e)(3).” Id. at 698. It “depart[ed] from the rule of construction that prefers ordinary meaning” because “the realization of clear Congressional policy (here, favoring the ability to impose supervised release) [was] in tension with the result that customary interpretive rules would deliver.” Id. at 706 n.9. Importantly, the Court so reasoned against the backdrop of an already-amended § 3583; it had access to a metaphorical crystal ball that made clear how Congress intended the supervised release statute to function. As a result, it “yield[ed] to the Congress of the United States” and abandoned textualism. Id. But § 3583 has been meaningfully amended in a manner that no longer requires application of an “unconventional” definition of revoke. The language of § 3583(e)(3) itself has changed, and Congress has also added subsection 3583(h), explicitly empowering district courts to impose a new term of supervised release following imprisonment post-revocation. Justice Scalia so recognized when he wrote: “This is not an important case, since it deals with the interpretation of a statute that has been amended to eliminate, for the future, the issue we today resolve.” Johnson,