Seaga Edward Gillard v. North Carolina

The Eighth Amendment forbids the imposition of the death penalty on a defendant “who aids and abets a felony in the course of which a murder is committed by others but who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be employed,” Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982), unless the defendant’s conduct shows he was a “major” participant in the felony and personally acted with “reckless indifference to human life,” Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987). In this case, however, state-law principles of vicarious liability short circuited the individualized consideration long required by this Court. In North Carolina, if a defendant joins with another to commit a crime, the defendant is not only guilty “if the other commits that particular crime, but he is also guilty of any other crime committed by the other in pursuance of the common purpose or as a natural or probable consequence thereof.” State v. Barnes, 481 S.E.2d 44, 71 (N.C. 1997) (cleaned up). Applying this broad accomplice liability, the lower court upheld Mr. Gillard’s death sentence based on his co-defendant’s state of mind, without requiring the jury to consider Mr. Gillard’s personal culpability first. The question presented for review is: Whether the Supreme Court of North Carolina violated this Court’s precedent when it held that a jury instruction requiring a finding of culpability under Enmund/Tison was not necessary to support Mr. Gillard’s death sentence for a killing he did not personally commit? -i-