Luis Fernandez v. United States

In United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019), this Court declared unconstitutionally vague the “residual clause” definition of the term “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) but left undisturbed the remaining “elements clause” definition. In this case, the Eleventh Circuit expressly recognized that “neither of [Mr. Fernandez’s two predicate] crimes”—i.e., conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery or attempted Hobbs Act robbery—“qualifies as a ‘crime of violence’ under the elements clause.” Fernandez v. United States, 114 F.4th 1170, 1175 (11th Cir. 2024). And Judge Rosenbaum, who authored the court’s opinion, openly acknowledged in a separate concurrence that Mr. Fernandez “stands convicted of and will spend twentyfive years in prison for something that Congress did not make a crime.” Id. at 1183. Nonetheless, the court affirmed the denial of his motion to vacate that illegal conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. It reasoned that Petitioner was required to prove that the district court had relied on the residual clause, as opposed to the elements clause, and he could not meet that burden of proof because the record was silent. As Judge Rosenbaum’s concurrence recognized, three circuits do not require § 2255 movants to satisfy that heightened burden of proof. Id. at 1186 n.3 (citing cases). The question presented is: Are federal courts precluded from granting a federal prisoner’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate an illegal conviction in light of Davis where the record is unclear about whether the conviction was based on the now-invalid residual clause?