Jem Accessories, Inc., dba Xtreme Cables, a New Jersey Corporation v. Harman International Industries, Inc., a Delaware Corporation

Congress codified the Lanham Act to provide one uniform national trademark law because state laws created as many laws as states. It declined to set a statute of limitations, opting to incorporate equity instead. Nonetheless, seven circuits borrow from “analogous” state laws to create limitations periods and presumptions of laches. Three circuits do not. Thus, the time limits to file suit vary widely by circuit and state—along with presumptions wrongly shifting the burden of proof on an affirmative defense. Borrowing recreates the very problem the Lanham Act was designed to solve. And it violates this Court’s exhortation in Occidental Life that federal courts may not import state law if it will frustrate national policies. Importing fifty state-statutes-of-limitations certainly frustrates the Act’s policy of national uniformity. The circuits also conflict on laches’ consequences, further undermining uniformity. The Third and Fifth Circuits apply laches backwards; forwards, they rightly permit relief for the continuing wrong of infringement. The Ninth Circuit, however, wielded laches below to reject all past and future relief, as do the Seventh and Federal Circuits. That contravenes this Court’s Menendez decision. A few years of delay can render a trademark owner powerless in the face of evolving activities ultimately devastating valuable intellectual property rights built over decades. Congress did not intend for these fragmented approaches and inequitable results. The questions presented are: W hether courts may borrow state statutes of limitations to create presumptions of laches in federal trademark actions under the Lanham Act. Whether courts may apply laches under the Lanham Act to bar all relief for recent and continuing wrongs.