John Doe v. Purdue University, et al.

Should this Court exercise its supervisory authority to preserve the appearance and fact of justice by requiring review now of a denial of recusal for bias shown pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455 that otherwise would mean a trial before a biased Magistrate Judge, the bias shown in his rulings and the extra-judicial bias in his nomination to the Seventh Circuit, who would then be a colleague of the Seventh Circuit judges at the time of an appeal from a final judgment?

Is it an important federal question for this Court’s consideration whether denials of recusal for bias shown pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455 be subject to appellate review per the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) and Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978), particularly given, as this Court held in Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986), that as a matter of constitutional law adjudication before a biased judge requires reversal regardless of the evidence and bias cannot effectively be adjudicated in an appeal of a final judgment?