David Harris v. American Accounting Association, et al.

Whether the Second Circuit Court of Appeals may, with regard to a case before it and all motions in respect thereof, delegate to an unauthorized staff attorney the judicial power to determine, without legally-sufficient or even any review, the: 1) cause of action, 2) relevant facts, 3) legal authorities, 4) parties’ arguments, 5) merits and sufficiency thereof, and 6) to “confidently recommend” a disposition of the case, and adopt these as the Court’s opinion? These are the powers enumerated in 28 U.S.C. 636 a district court judge or the parties can delegate to a magistrate judge. Can circuit courts do so without any of the protections in 28 U.S.C. 636; in secret, without consent or even notice to the parties, who have no right to object, demand review, or even to appeal the consequent, foreseeably-wrongful decisions, because appeal to this Supreme Court is had only by permission? When contrasted with the substantial and detailed enumerated powers, qualifications, independence and protections Congress gives to parties, as set forth in 28 U.S.C. 631-637, is it unlawful for circuit courts of appeals to delegate such unlimited judicial power to staff attorneys when in 28 U.S.C. 715 Congress explicitly provides to staff attorneys only the same powers and protections of parties it gives with respect to circuit court’s secretaries and filing clerks; none? Whether, without regard to the unconstitutionality of delegating judicial power as described above, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals may invidiously discriminate based on the “the size of an appellant’s pocketbook” by inflicting this second-class legal process specifically, routinely, and officially on all pro se appellants appearing before it, but not wealthy appellants who pay the price of a first-class ticket to firstclass justice by retaining high-powered, high-priced attorneys? Whether, in Petitioner’s case, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals may commit plain errors of fact and law by, without legally sufficient review, accepting and ruling in accord with the staff attorney’s “confidently recommended] disposition” that fails even to acknowledge the existence of facts plainly alleged in the Amended Complaint and raised in the appeal and in a motion for rehearing, let alone take them to be true, and that also fails to acknowledge the existence of on-point, controlling New York precedent similarly brought before the Court, let alone apply it as required under Erie v. Tompkins? Whether this Court should consider and decide the unconstitutional overdelegation-of-judicial-power arguments, above, the so-called “legal process” Petitioner received from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, though Petitioner did