Huntington Ingalls Incorporated v. Lynn Barrosse, et al.

The Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA) establishes a comprehensive system of no-fault workers’ compensation for workplace injuries on or near the “navigable waters of the United States.” 33 U.S.C. § 903(a). The Act’s guaranteed no-fault compensation remedy for such injuries, however, comes with a corresponding benefit for employers. The Act expressly provides that the “liability of an employer” under the LHWCA “shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer” as to “anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages . . . at law or in admiralty on account of such injury.” Id. § 905(a); see also id. § 933(i) (same “exclusive remedy” rule for suits brought against co-employees). Numerous federal courts of appeals and state high courts have held that the LHWCA means what it says, and thus preempts state-law tort actions against an injured worker’s employer and co-employees—the quintessential actions for “damages . . . at law.” Yet, the Fifth Circuit below—following Louisiana statecourt precedent—held that a maritime employee who was injured on the job may pursue a state-law tort claim for damages against his employer, even though an LHWCA remedy for that injury is available. The question presented is whether the Fifth Circuit correctly held—in conflict with the decisions of other federal and state courts of appeals—that an injured maritime employee who has a workers’ compensation remedy under the LHWCA may pursue a state-law tort claim for damages instead.