H. C., Individually and on Behalf of J. C., a Child With a Disability, et al. v. New York City Department of Education

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) provides multiple time-sensitive dispute resolution measures, including due process hearings that are subject to a United States District Court’s discretion, under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B), to award reasonable attorneys’ fees as defined under five subsequent subsections, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C) – (G), which specify “rates prevailing in the community” without “bonus or multiplier,” prohibit certain fees unless a prevailing parent was substantially justified in rejecting an offer by the school district, and direct that a court finding of “unreasonabl[eness]” or “excess[]” in fees result in a reduction except “in any action or proceeding if the court finds that the State or local educational agency unreasonably protracted the final resolution of the action or proceeding or there was a violation of this section.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C) – (G). The questions presented are:

1. How does 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(G) affect an award of attorneys’ fees under the IDEA?

2. What, if any, limit(s) constrain(s) a federal court’s discretion in making an initial determination of; the “rates prevailing in the community” under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C)?

3. Can a settlement offer’s express exclusion of any post-settlement interest ever make a parent substantially justified in rejecting such offer?