Harisadhan Patra, et ux. v. Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education, et al.

Supreme Court precedents require, “The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986); Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 659, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1868 (2014). Further, Supreme Court precedents require that credibility determinations be left for the jury, and have held that the jury’s disbelief of the employer is a “form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000). Further, in First Amendment retaliation injury contexts, the Supreme Court precedent warrants an “independent” review to apply facts to specified constitutional standards. E.g. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984). There are some inter-circuit and intra-circuit disputes about whether Plaintiffs must be “chilled” and cease exercising their First-Amendment rights altogether to demonstrate an injury. Also, the objective criteria on how to examine and decide “blasphemous insults” as “pervasive” or “severe” are lacking because, individual perceptions and opinions differ, and one often cannot fathom the trauma of religious insults to a person from another religion. Thus, the QUESTIONS PRESENTED are as follows: 1. Do the United States Court of Appeals have obligations to enforce FRCP 56 and the Supreme Court’s precedents when Statement of Material Facts and supporting records filed by movants, pursuant to Local Rules, contradicted other records filed pursuant to FRCP 56? Specifically, should Courts admit movants’ Statement of Material Facts and assertions, pursuant to Local Rules, even when contradicted by records filed pursuant to FRCP 56 by movants and/or