Coronavirus Reporter, et al. v. Apple Inc.

Did the District Court err in denying leave to amend a first-to-file developer antitrust lawsuit concerning free digital apps, when Petitioner Dr. Jeffrey Isaacs had never amended his complaint once as a matter of course, and no Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962) factors were analyzed?

Does the tying of digital software distribution stores to the iPhone device by Apple Inc., represent pernicious conduct subject to the per se antitrust rule established in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958)?

Does Apple’s contrived digital notary stamp represent a modern-day stamp tax which facilitates gatekeeping and censorship of software distribution, violating Northern Pacific tying rules?

In light of Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985), and its established precedent on the significance of exclusionary conduct in Section 2 claims, beyond the confines of market definition, was a Rule 12 dismissal for purported market definition defects of free apps improper?

Is the failure of the current Brown Shoe pricing formulas to define free digital products as a relevant market, as practiced by Apple Inc., indicative of a need for the Court to revisit the original text of the Sherman Act or to refine the application of Brown Shoe?