Robert A. Eaton v. Montana Silversmiths

In determining Whether the Ninth Circuit had power to Waive Eaton’s Constitutional rights in their Memorandum regarding connection of personnel policy to the termination and Pv2, which were vague and unclear. ‘Waiving of rights” or “arguments abandoned” with “waiver” being “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right” According to Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), which Eaton did not knowingly abandon any of his Rights. “[W]aiver of constitutional rights in any context must, at the very least be clear”; Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.W. 389, 393 (1937) (stating courts should indulge in every rea­ sonable presumption against waiver” in civil cases where fundamental rights were at issue). “Courts do not resume acquiescence in loss of fundamental rights.” Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937). Could the 9th Circuit’s waiving of rights and focus on PEvl, show a piecemealing of Eaton’s case while not looking at the ‘totality of the case’, thus differing their opinion with 11th Circuit court that states a negative performance evaluation warrants the claimants case looked at as a whole.

Whether the Ninth Circuit violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by not answering all of Eaton’s questions on appeal. Two of the questions being, 1) Would the lack of being heard via oral hearing disallow the ability to show existential and substantial evidence which could prove legitimate business reasons were illegitimate. Would the lower courts need to maintain allowance of following Montana Codes annotated with allowance of the hearing if they were using other MCA laws for reference in the case?

Would altering and withholding of evidence causing