Rachel Evens v. David Gilbertson, et al.

The U.S. Const, amend. XIV, §1 states that all persons are subject to the jurisdiction of the State wherein they reside. In order to exercise judicial authority over parties, a court must first hold both personal and subject matter jurisdiction as defined by their con­ gress or legislative statutes. Absolute judicial immun­ ity is a common-law doctrine, established since 1871. However, it was clearly defined that judicial immun­ ity would not apply if the judge acted with full knowledge that statutory subject matter jurisdiction was completely absent. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1978).1 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has decided that the U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1 and legislature no longer determines jurisdiction, but expanded this common-law principle by deciding that Absolute Judicial Immunity applies to any act performed by a judge in the judicial setting, “which is gauged by... whether it is a function nor­ mally performed by a judge”. This ruling directly con­ tradicts both absolute constitutional privileges, long­ standing established case law established by this Su­ preme Court of the United States, being also prohib­ ited by South Dakota and Montana statutes. The Petitioner invoked the Federal Court’s di­ versity jurisdiction as Rachel and her four minor 1 "[T]he necessary inquiry in determining whether a defendant judge is immune from suit is whether at the time he took the challenged action he had jurisdiction over the subject matter before him." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1978)