Jonathan VanLoan v. Nation of Islam, et al.

The district judge dismissed Petitioner’s case, claiming that his factual allegations are “fantastical”, and his case “frivolous”, for the purposes of subject matter jurisdiction. The court of appeals affirmed. The problem is, Petitioner’s factual allegations are true, and his case alleges some of the most serious violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in recent historymultiple government officials, aiding the Nation of Islam, in its attempts to murder a Christian White man, for private protected speech, the Nation of Islam found offensive. Two different Circuit courts of appeals, the Third and Ninth, have affirmed dismissal of Petitioner’s civil rights cases, On subject matter ; urisdiction grounds, as “frivolous”, for his “fantastical ” factual allegations. The Third Circuit did not app y the correct legal standard of “clearly baseless”, Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), and Dento n v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992), for affirming the dismissal of Peti­ tioner’s case. It used the older ‘ categories” standard of Hagans v. Levine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974), for “frivolous”. The Questions Presented are: 1. Is the legal standard for dismissal of a plaintiffs 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case, for factual allegations deemed “fantastical” by the court, the “clearly baseless” stan­ dard of Neitzke and Denton? If so, were the dismissal of Petitioner’s case, and the affirmation thereof in the Third Circuit, incorrect as a matter of law?