Evan Greebel v. United States

The Consumer Credit Protection Act (“CCPA” or the “Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., establishes important protections for individuals against excessive garnishment orders. Specifically, the CCPA provides that no more than 25% of an individual’s “earnings” may be garnished in most federal and state garnishment proceedings, id. § 1673(a), including proceedings involving restitution orders under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996. The CCPA defines the term “earnings” as “compensation paid or payable for personal services.” 15 U.S.C. § 1672(a). But the circuits are openly and irreconcilably split over how to interpret and apply that definition. The Eighth Circuit, along with the Department of Labor—which is charged by Congress with enforcement of the CCPA—reads the definition according to its plain terms to hold that whether payments qualify as “earnings” depends on the compensatory character of the payment. The Second Circuit in the decision below, in contrast, follows the Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits in relying on stray statements in the CCPA’s legislative history, cited in dicta by this Court in Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974), to exclude from the definition of “earnings” compensation for personal services paid in a lumpsum, as opposed to periodically. The question presented is: Whether lump-sum compensatory payments to an individual, such as those made pursuant to a retirement plan, qualify as “earnings” subject to the CCPA’s garnishment limitations.