Ewin Oscar Martinez v. United States

Ewin Oscar Martinez was convicted in 2000 of using and carrying a firearm during a “crime of violence” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), based upon two federal-criminal-law predicates: (1) hostage-taking, under § 924(c)’s “residual clause,” which was later invalidated in United States v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 2319 (2019), and (2) carjacking, under the still-valid “elements clause.” In a habeas petition filed after Davis invalidated § 924(c)’s residual clause, he argued among other things that he was actually innocent of § 924(c) because he was actually innocent of the sole remaining valid predicate “crime of violence” (carjacking); that is because he did not take the vehicle in question in the presence of another and did not use force, violence, or intimidation to take it, as required by the carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119. The questions presented are: 1.a. Whether a person violates the federal carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119, by taking a motor vehicle not in the presence of its owner and without any force, violence, or intimidation, and then subsequently uses force, violence, or intimidation against the vehicle’s owner in connection with a different crime. 1.b. Whether a habeas petitioner may assert he is actually innocent, thereby avoiding a procedural default, of a § 924(c) conviction on the grounds that he is actually innocent of any