Virgin America, Inc., et al. v. Julia Bernstein, et al., Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated

The Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) expressly preempts state laws that are “related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier.” 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1). This “deliberately expansive” language broadly preempts state laws that affect airline prices, routes, and services—even if the state law is “not specifically designed to affect” airlines, and even if its “effect is only indirect,” as long as it is not “too tenuous, remote, or peripheral.” Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384-86, 390 (1992) (citations omitted). The ADA thus preempts a state law that has “a ‘significant impact’” on carriers’ rates, routes, or services. Rowe v. N. H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364, 370 (2008) (quoting Morales, 504 U.S. at 390). The Ninth Circuit rejects that standard. It holds that the ADA does not preempt generally applicable “background” rules unless they “bind[] the carrier to a particular price, route, or service.” App. 20a (citation omitted). Applying that categorical rule here, the Ninth Circuit held that the ADA does not preempt applying California’s meal-and-rest-break laws to flight attendants. In doing so, it refused even to consider the significant impact of state-mandated breaks— which conflict with FAA regulations governing flight attendants’ responsibilities and rest breaks—on airline prices, routes, and services. The question presented is: Does the ADA preempt generally applicable state laws that have a significant impact on airline prices, routes, and services, as this Court and four circuits have held, or does it preempt such laws only if they bind an airline to a particular price, route, or service, as the Ninth Circuit has held?