David J. Tatara v. Mark S. Inch, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.

David Tatara stood trial on charges of first-degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse in state court. He moved for judgment of acquittal after the prosecution rested. Tatara argued that the State failed to prove the charged offenses because the evidence was insufficient to prove aggravated battery, the predicate offense for the felony murder charge. The court announced that it would grant his motion. In granting the motion, the court expressed its belief that the evidence as to both offenses was insufficient. The trial court also advised the jury that it had made a legal ruling that would obviate the need to consider the two charged offenses. However, instead of concluding the proceedings after acquitting Tatara, the court permitted the State to file a new Information containing a previously uncharged crime—second-degree murder—that contained a new mens rea element—depraved mind. The trial court submitted the case to the jury the next day. The jury convicted Tatara of second-degree murder. After exhausting his state court remedies, Tatara petitioned the federal courts for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that his conviction violated due process and the prohibition against Double Jeopardy. 1. Does a conviction of a crime submitted to the jury through a superseding information filed after jeopardy attached and after the court granted judgment of acquittal on the original charged offenses violate the prohibition against Double Jeopardy?