Bernice Curry-Malcolm v. Rochester City School District, et al.

The Questions Presented are:

1. Rule 2.11 of the Code of Conduct and as pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455 and Cannon 3C(1) of the Code of United States Judges applies that a judge shall disqualify or recuse himself or herself in any pro­ ceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, This Court ruled that “Recusal is required when, objectively speaking, “the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitu­ tionally tolerable,” should this Court overrule its standing in Rippo v. Baker?

2. A federal judge should recuse himself if “a reason­ able person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might rea­ sonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 144; 28 U.S.C. § 455; Yagman u. Republic Insurance, 987?

3. The district court prefiling sanction against pro se Curry-Malcolm was improperly imposed and con­ flicts with other circuits, including the Ninth Cir­ cuit, See Ringgold-Lockhart u. Cnty. ofLos Angeles, 761 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1147-48 (9th Cir. 1990)). Whether prefiling sanctions ordered and entered without notice and opportunity to be heard are unconstitutional and should they be used as a mechanism to deprive pro se litigants of their rights to due process? See Moates v. Barkley, 147 F.3d 207, 208 (2d Cir. 1998); Malcolm v. Ass’n of Supervisors & Adm’rs of Rochester, 388 F. Supp. 3d 242 (W.D.N.Y. 2019), aff’d in part,