Matthew Liebovich, et al. v. Diane Janice Tobin, et al.

Notice is an “elementary and fundamental requirement of due process,” so where a court enters a judgment absent notice, the Due Process Clause demands “‘wip[ing] the slate clean . . . [and] restor[ing] the petitioner to the position he would have occupied had due process of law been accorded to him in the first place.” Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 84, 87 (1988) (internal citation omitted). Citing California Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d) (“The court may. . . set aside any void judgment or order”), a state appellate court held trial courts have discretion to deny motions to vacate a void judgment – even one entered without notice. The Court of Appeal held Peralta did not apply because it did not “purport[] to address whether the existence of a meritorious defense may be considered when a trial court is exercising its discretion under section 473, subdivision (d).” (Emphasis in original.) Does Peralta compel courts to vacate void judgments entered absent notice, or does the lack of express reference in this Court’s opinion to California Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d) permit California courts to deny such motions to vacate? More generally, does U.S. Supreme Court precedent constrain the application of a state statute only when the decision specifically cites the statute?