Peter Kagel v. Jay Laurence Raftery, et al.

Should the “Inextricably Intertwined” doctrine be abolished because it violates the due process clause of the 14th Amendment since it is unconstitutionally vague, not fact based, subjective and arbitrary and its application illegally displaces the Ninth Circuit’s own Janjua v. Neufeld 933 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2019) Issue Preclusion test that is mandated to be employed in Rooker-Feldman doctrine cases by the Supreme Court’s decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. 544 U.S. 280, 284

and for its rationale of denying Federal jurisdiction by outlawing this fraud case simply because it naturally has to include some of the damages which were sought in the underlying case even though the Parties, the fraud legal theory and the statutory remedy sought in this case are different than the Parties, the legal theory and the statutory remedy in the underlying case plus this case cannot overturn or affect the underlying case in any way?

Should Federal subject matter jurisdiction be granted in an Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) case which alleges that a plaintiff was fraudulently deprived of his Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial?

In an ADA case in which a fraud victim was deprived of a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, is he entitled to have a jury trial in Federal Court because only a jury can make the finding of fact, after listening to all of the evidence, that fraud has been committed?

Should the Supreme Court grant Federal subject matter jurisdiction and set aside and vacate the judgment in this case and remand this case to the Ninth Circuit to allow Petitioner to move forward with this case and at the same time keep the First Amendment litigation privilege intact by not protecting in-court speech made by attorneys to the Trial Court regarding how they fulfilled their mandatory statutory duties during settlement contract formation required by Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1565(3) and 1585 because the fulfillment of these regular duties cannot be deemed to be advocating for a client’s case and which will assure that the victim’s attorney will not be vulnerable to a malicious prosecution lawsuit if the case fails and a plaintiff who alleges fraud caused by this in-court speech will not have to represent himself in Pro Se nor will it affect the underlying Appellate decision in any way by making the following ruling: The First Amendment litigation privilege does not protect in-court representations made by attorneys to a Trial Court which are made to reveal how they complied with their required mandated statutory duties during settlement contract formation?

Should the First Amendment litigation privilege not protect in-court “malice” speech as defined in Cal. Civ. Code § 47(c) when there is an allegation in a complaint that the attorney-defendants deprived a victim of his Seventh Amendment constitutional right to a jury trial by their fraudulent in-court speech to the Trial Court in response to questioning about their fulfillment of their mandatory statutory duties during settlement contract formation which cannot be classified as “advocacy” as a matter of law to shield a victim’s attorney from being subject to a malicious prosecution lawsuit if the case fails and the victim will not be forced to have to represent himself in Pro Se which is a major disadvantage. 6. Should a three judge Federal Appeals Panel, to prevent its rulings from being unconstitutionally vague, be required to specifically identify each and every issue which it rules was not properly raised in an Opening Brief or raised the first time on appeal when citing as authority Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009), or any such authority, rather than making blanket “boilerplate” unspecific rulings claiming that issues were not properly raised without an explanation?

Due to the Covid-19 emergency and Petitioner’s Federal Court litigation inexperience deficiency, should the Judgment that there are no facts supporting a Federal Question alleged in Petitioner’s First Amended Complaint, and that he cannot allege subject matter jurisdiction instead of diversity jurisdiction, be vacated and set aside and remanded to the Ninth Circuit to allow Petitioner to carry forward with this lawsuit under FRCP Rule § 60 because of the following facts: a. The San Francisco Federal Court House was shut and its website was unresponsive from August 7, 2020 on when Petitioner was trying to register as a Pro Se plaintiff; b. Petitioner needed to register as a Pro Se plaintiff to be able to file his lawsuit electronically and the Help phone line was unresponsive to his several calls; c. In desperation Petitioner phoned the Ninth Circuit Clerk’s Office around 10:30 a.m. on August 14, 2020 and was informed that he could physically file his Complaint if he overnight mailed it “today” along with the initial paperwork and the Clerk’s Office would backdate the complaint to August 17, the last day he could file to be within the three year fraud statute of limitations, when it reopened on August 18; d. This directive gave Petitioner just an hour and a half to draw his initial paperwork and complaint because the Post Office was closing at Noon. What ensued was a mad scramble in which Petitioner attached the wrong exhibits and built the complaint on the California Fraud statutes using the criminal police report he made to the San Francisco Police Department instead of using the appropriate Federal Fraud statutes; e. Petitioner knew what the proper Federal statutes were because he had made a criminal complaint to the FBI against the defendant-attorneys and it was virtually a declaration because it is a felony to lie to the FBI under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, (Northern District docket No. 24.1 Exhibit J) f. The Complaint and the First Amended Complaint were virtually the same very rough draft. The only difference between the two is that the First Amended Complaint had the proper exhibits attached; g. It has always been Petitioner’s practice to have important documents proofread by his legal colleagues which was an impossibility. During the litigation which followed Petitioner overlooked that he did not amend diversity jurisdiction to subject matter jurisdiction in his declaration containing his proposed Second Amended Complaint. The proposed Second Amended Complaint was written in a compressed timeframe under pressure;