Heena Shim-Larkin v. United States District Court for the Southern District of New York

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal's criticism regarding the infamous Chicago 7 trial includes that “in comparable situations, the judge was more likely to exercise his discretion against the defense than against the government.”; and “the court made rulings which were, comparatively, more restrictive against the defense than the government.” Since the time of that trial, in the 1970s, American jurisprudence, including 28 U.S.C. § 455 in 1974, adopted an objective standard of recusal. Given such history, if a judge makes rulings more restrictive against one party than the other in comparable situations, does such judge must be disqualified under 28 U.S.C. §455?

If a judge makes rulings more restrictive against pro se party than attorneys in comparable situations, does it aggravate the level of favoritism enough to require the judge's recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455 and grant of mandamus appeal?

When a party reasonably has brought errors to the attention of a judge, if the judge reacts as certifying that an appeal would not be taken in good faith under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), instead of correcting the errors, does it demonstrate that the judge took it as a personal attack and display the judge's inability to render fair judgment, which requires recusal?