Rodney Bernard Allen v. United States

In Texas, a defendant commits simple robbery if, during the course of a theft, he recklessly causes someone else to suffer bodily injury or knowingly causes a victim to fear imminent bodily injury (even if he never meets, confronts, or interacts with the victim). Could reasonable jurists debate whether the crime defined by Texas Penal Code § 29.02(a) is categorically violent under the Armed Career Criminal Act’s elements clause, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)?

After the Fifth Circuit granted prefiling authorization for the successive motion to vacate, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h), the parties contested the case and the district court decided the case solely on the merits—whether the robbery convictions remained violent felonies without the ACCA’s unconstitutional residual clause. But when Mr. Allen later sought a Certificate of Appealability to challenge the district court’s adverse merits ruling, the Fifth Circuit sua sponte invoked its decision in United States v. Clay, 921 F.3d 550 (5th Cir. 2019). Under Clay, a successive § 2255 movant who invokes the new rule in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that that his sentencing judge subjectively relied upon the ACCA’s residual clause at the original sentencing hearing. Could reasonable jurists debate the Fifth Circuit’s sua sponte application of Clay to this case?