Marion E. Pitch, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Anthony S. Pitch, et al. v. United States

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6 governs grand jury proceedings, including the obligations of secrecy imposed on specific classes of persons under Rule 6(c). This Rule also expressly lists five exceptions under Rule 6(e) that permit the disclosure of grand jury materials under certain notable circumstances. Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals are divided on the question of whether the Federal District Court possesses the inherent authority to release grand jury materials outside of the enumerated exceptions under Rule 6(e). The Second and Seventh Circuits have specifically recognized that such authority exists upon a showing of exceptional circumstances and have applied this standard to applications for the release of grand jury materials in cases of national historical significance. The Eleventh Circuit’s recent en banc decision in the case at bar deepened the Circuit Split arising out of the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in McKeever v. Barr, 920 F.3d 842 (D.C. Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 589 U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 597 (Jan. 21, 2020), concluding that no such inherent authority exists. This critical split arose after the District Court’s inherent authority was uniformly relied upon to release such materials in cases of historical significance. The instant matter seeks the disclosure of grand jury materials arising from one of the last unsolved mass lynching crimes, the Moore’s Ford Grand Jury convened in Georgia in December 1946, a case of exceptional historical significance which occurred at the onset of the modern Civil Rights Movement. THE QUESTION PRESENTED IS: 1. Whether the Federal District Court has the inherent authority under case law precedent or the