Congregation Rabbinical College of Tartikov, Inc., et al. v. Village of Pomona, New York, et al.

W hen it enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc, et seq., Congress created a cause of action allowing a claimant to “obtain appropriate relief against a government.” Id. § 2000cc-2(a). Congress expressly directed that standing “to assert a claim” “shall be governed by the general rules of standing under article III of the Constitution.” Id. The Second Circuit below, as have the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, looked beyond those general rules of standing under Article III, and, relying on other considerations, concluded that the Petitioners lacked standing to assert RLUIPA claims arising under the Substantial Burdens provision of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a), as well as claims arising under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. In doing so, the Second Circuit entered a decision in conflict with decisions of the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits. The question presented is: Whether, under RLUIPA’s Substantial Burdens provision, an owner of real property seeking to use such property for religious exercise has Article III standing to challenge a municipality’s zoning law that prohibits outright the owner’s proposed land use without first being required to either apply for permits or variances that the municipality has no power to grant or to seek a legislative change to the zoning law from the municipality?