Lewis Alan Dugan v. Wyoming

Petitioner, a developmentally disabled and incarcerated adult, wrote letters to a woman, with content that was usually mundane, occasionally sexual, but never personally threatening, In the absence of a restraining order, the State of Wyoming charged and convicted him under the Wyoming Stalking Statute, W.S. § 6-2-506, and the trial court sentenced him to four to seven years in prison. At trial, Petitioner requested the jury be instructed regarding the legal definition of obscene under the standard set forth in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607 (1973). The Wyoming Supreme Court held that such an instruction was not necessary because the Wyoming Stalking Statute punishes conduct, not speech. The Questions Presented for review are:

1. Whether, in a prosecution for writing obscene letters, a trial court should instruct a jury regarding the legal definition of the term “obscene” as set forth in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607 (1973)?

2. Whether a prosecution based on the content of mailed letters is a crime of conduct; or is it a crime of speech, or both conduct and speech, thereby implicating the defendant’s First Amendment rights?

3. Whether the Wyoming Stalking Statute, W.S. § 6-2-506, is constitutionally overbroad, either facially or as-applied to the facts of this case?