Keith Chester Hill v. Lorie Davis, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division

A federal habeas petitioner who alleges that trial counsel was ineffective at a capital sentencing proceeding must show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. The Fifth Circuit has held that a petitioner who alleges that counsel was ineffective at a state, non-capital, discretionary sentencing proceeding must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, his sentence would have been “significantly less harsh.” This Court rejected the “significantly less harsh” standard, as applied to a federal sentence, and held that the imposition of any additional jail time as a result of counsel’s errors is sufficient to demonstrate prejudice. Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203 (2001). The Fifth Circuit, while acknowledging that Glover abrogated this standard as applied to a federal sentence, continues to apply it to a state, non-capital, discretionary sentence. It held that petitioner failed to show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, his state sentence would have been “significantly less harsh,” and it affirmed the denial of habeas corpus relief. The question presented is: Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that, to demonstrate that counsel was ineffective at a state, non-capital, discretionary